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Abstract—Keystroke dynamics study the way in which users input text via their keyboards. Having the ability to differentiate users,
typing behaviors can unobtrusively form a component of a behavioral biometric recognition system to improve existing account security.
Keystroke dynamics systems on free-text data have previously required 500 or more characters to achieve reasonable performance. In
this paper, we propose a novel instance-based graph comparison algorithm called the instance-based tail area density (ITAD) metric to
reduce the number of keystrokes required to authenticate users. Additionally, commonly used features in the keystroke dynamics
literature, such as monographs and digraphs, are all found to be useful in informing who is typing. The usefulness of these features for
authentication is determined using a random forest classifier and validated across two publicly available datasets. Scores from the
individual features are fused to form a single matching score. With the fused matching score and our ITAD metric, we achieve equal
error rates (EERs) for 100 and 200 testing digraphs of 9.7% and 7.8% for the Clarkson II dataset, improving upon state-of-the-art of
35.3% and 15.3%.
Index Terms—Keystroke dynamics, biometrics, continuous authentication, monograph, digraph, fusion, classification
F
1 INTRODUCTION
I N today’s world, with tremendous amounts of sensitive databecoming digitized, protecting private user data is paramount.
Passwords or other single-sign-on (SSO) security measures are
typically the only line of defense against attackers. With the
large number of accounts and passwords people are expected
to remember, people tend to choose easily guessable passwords.
For example, it was found in a major data breach that 60%
of passwords were easily guessable [1]. An additional form of
verification to supplement SSO security schemes is needed to
monitor the user of a device to ensure they are authorized.
Keystroke dynamics is a behavioral biometric that offers strong
performance distinguishing users based on typing patterns [2], [3],
[4]. Keystroke dynamics can be used to provide an additional
continuous layer of security to supplement an existing system
to detect intruders in a more robust fashion. Furthermore, as
most computers already have a keyboard, this layer of continuous
security does not require any additional hardware.
Keystroke dynamics systems have two steps, training and
testing. During the training phase, as many keystrokes as feasibly
and practically possible are collected from the authorized user and
used to build a profile. In many systems, features such as durations
of monographs and digraphs (hold time and flight time of key-
presses associated with specific letter combinations as shown in
Figure 1) are extracted from the keystrokes. The testing phase
consists of keystrokes from an unknown user which are compared
to an authorized user’s profile to determine if the keystrokes came
from the authorized user or an imposter.
There are two main types of keystroke dynamics: fixed-text
and free-text. Fixed-text requires the keystrokes of the test sample
to exactly match with the keystrokes of the profile. The fixed text
keystrokes can constitute a password or any other phrase. Most of
• Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Clarkson University,
Potsdam, NY, 13676 USA.
E-mails: {ayottebj, mbanavar, dhou, sschucke}@clarkson.edu
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of how monograph and the four different
digraph features can be extracted from two consecutive keystrokes.
These digraphs can also be referred to as press-press, press-release,
release-press, and release-release (see [5], [6]).
the literature for keystroke dynamics is related to fixed-text and
performance can be strong on passwords or phrases of around 10
characters. For example, Kilhourhy and Maxion achieved an EER
of 9.6% for a fixed-text sample of “.tie5Roanl” [7].
Free-text, on the other hand, puts no restrictions on the
keystrokes users can type. Some studies provide guidance on what
users should write about, which is considered to be controlled
free-text. In contrast, uncontrolled free-text puts absolutely no
restrictions on what users can type, capturing user behavior while
they naturally type. Continuous authentication in the uncontrolled
free-text setting is difficult because users can participate in many
different activities while typing. It is possible that a user’s typing
behavior can vary across activity or content. Additionally, getting
enough similar characters in the profile and test samples can be
challenging if the user is typing in different contexts. Huang et al.,
performed a benchmarking study where three leading algorithms
were compared across four publicly available datasets and found
that algorithms with the same profile and test sample sizes perform
consistently worse in the uncontrolled free-text environment [8].
Table 1 shows the number of keystrokes for commonly typed
texts [9]. Requiring large numbers of keystrokes before these
systems can detect an intruder could allow for considerable
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damage to be done. Existing keystroke dynamics research in
the uncontrolled free-text environment have been primarily done
with large keystroke samples [8], [10], [11], [12]. Many existing
algorithms are distribution-based and rely on comparing distribu-
tions of digraph durations between the reference and the test user
[3], [8]. Distribution-based algorithms require large numbers of
keystrokes for both training and testing, resulting in less frequent
authentication or authentication after a significant amount of typ-
ing has occurred. Currently, the existing algorithms require 500,
or more keystrokes to authenticate users. For example, previous
work achieved best EERs on the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets
of 3.6% and 1.95% for test sample sizes of 1,000 DD digraphs
and 1,000 keystrokes respectively [8], [9].
TABLE 1
Estimates of character counts for various types of texts [9].
Typed Text Characters
Average tweet length 60-70
Average sentence 75-100
Phishing email 120
Average Facebook post 155
Gettysburg Address 1450
Nigerian prince emails 1500-2500
For a continuous authentication system to be useful, users
should be authenticated as quickly and often as possible. This will
increase overall usability and lead to the acceptability of keystroke
dynamics as a behavioral biometric. To increase the speed of
authentication, decisions need to be made after as few keystrokes
as possible. To reduce the number of keystrokes needed for authen-
tication, we use instance-based algorithms, which compare graph
times from the test sample individually to the reference profile.
Instance-based methods are not foreign to keystroke dynamics,
but are extensively used for fixed-text [7], [13].
In this paper, we propose a novel instance-based metric
called the instance-based tail area density (ITAD) metric. The
performance of the ITAD metric is compared to algorithms
previously used for keystroke dynamics including Manhattan,
scaled Manhattan, Mahalanobis, transformed Mahalanobis, and
KDE [6], [7], [8]. Furthermore, the importance of monographs
and digraphs, commonly used features in keystroke dynamics,
is determined for user authentication. The features are fused at
the score level into a single fused matching score using the
feature importances determined from a random forest classifier.
The effectiveness of our fused matching score is demonstrated on
two publicly available datasets, the Clarkson II [14] and Buffalo
[12] datasets. Authentication with as few keystrokes as possible
allows imposters to be detected faster and thus better protects
sensitive user data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
related work, Section 3 the features commonly used in keystroke
dynamics research, Section 4 discusses the two free-text datasets,
and Section 5 the algorithms used. The algorithms are compared
in Section 6, and Section 7 discusses how the keystroke features
are fused at the score level. Lastly, the ITAD metric is evaluated
in Section 8. Concluding remarks and future work are presented
in Section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
The amount of research done with free-text is much smaller
compared to fixed-text. Furthermore, the majority of free-text
research is controlled. A survey citing more than 180 works in
keystroke dynamics [2] finds that as of 2013 there are roughly
8 times more papers working with fixed-text authentication than
with free-text authentication. Of these free-text papers, even fewer
are in the uncontrolled setting.
Features used in keystroke dynamics consist primarily of
monographs (hold time of a key) and digraphs (elapsed time
between two consecutive key-presses) [2], [3], [8], [10], [15], [16].
Other common features including trigraphs (elapsed time between
three consecutive key-presses) and larger n-graphs (elapsed time
between n consecutive key-presses) have also been shown to
be effective at distinguishing between users [17]. However, it is
unlikely to get enough of these large n-graphs that are shared
between the profile and test set especially when authenticating
users with minimal keystrokes. Other features used in keystroke
dynamics consist of relative timing between graphs [10], pressure
(only when using specialized keyboards) [18], splitting the key-
board into regions [19], typing speed (words per minute) [20],
error rate of typing [20], [21], press/release ordering [20], and
percentage of special characters [21].
Researchers that use both monographs and digraphs typically
weight the features equally, i.e. monographs and digraphs con-
tribute equally to the final decision. Joyce and Gupta created a fea-
ture vector from keystrokes which included both monographs and
digraphs [22]. To perform authentication, the Manhattan distance
was used to create a distance score between the profile and test
sample. In their experiment the monographs and digraphs carried
the same weight. Monrose and Rubin also used monographs and
digraphs and weighted them equally [15].
Authentication via free-text keystroke dynamics has been
known to work well with large numbers of keystrokes [10]. For
their research, Gunetti and Picardi evaluated performance on free-
text keystroke dynamics systems with 700 to 900 characters.
While their smallest test sample was roughly 200 characters, we
cannot perform a meaningful comparison to [10] because they
do not present a ROC or DET curve of their results, but instead
a single point. More recently, researchers have started trying to
reduce the number of keystrokes required for authentication [6],
[9], [23].
Ayotte et al. investigate the performance of existing state-
of-the-art free-text distribution-based algorithms on small and
large test sample sizes [9]. The authors experimented with test
sample sizes of 100, 200, 500, and 1,000 DD digraphs with a
profile size of 10,000 DD digraphs. It was found that by fusing
three algorithms (KDE, Energy, and KS [9]) at the decision
level, comparable performance could be achieved with 500 testing
digraphs instead of 1,000. However, for less than 500 digraphs it
was found that there was not always enough of the same digraph
in the test sample to make a comparison and the performance
degraded (EERs could not even be calculated at less than 80 DD
digraphs). The authors concluded that the performance of their
distribution-based classifier was strong for large test sample sizes
(500 or more DD digraphs), but did not perform well with small
test samples sizes (200 or fewer DD digraphs).
In a later work by Ayotte et al. [6], instance-based algorithms
were applied to uncontrolled free-text. Additionally, to capture
more information about users, monographs and the four digraphs
seen in Figure 1 were used instead of just the DD digraph. This
approach was applied to the Clarkson II uncontrolled free-text
dataset, and with 30,000 DD digraphs in the profile, achieved
EERs of 7.9%, 5.7%, 3.4%, 2.7% with 50, 100, 200, and 500
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graphs, respectively, in the test sample. The test samples were
formed from graphs randomly selected from all available graphs.
Therefore, for each test sample, each feature may have graphs
from different samples. While this type of sampling is not realistic,
the results show that authentication on uncontrolled free-text with
small test samples is possible.
Mondal and Bours argue that many of the works in keystroke
dynamics labeled as continuous authentication are in fact periodic
authentication (PA) [23], [24]. Periodic refers to authentication
being performed on blocks of keystrokes rather than on each
individual keystroke. The authors proposed a new way to measure
the effectiveness of continuous and periodic authentication sys-
tems: the average number of imposter actions (ANIA) and average
number of genuine actions (ANGA). The ANIA is the average
number of keystrokes before an imposter is detected while the
ANGA is the average number of keystrokes before a true user
is falsely rejected. Mondal and Bours developed a trust based
model capable of achieving strong performance and making a
decision after each keystroke. For most users, the algorithm never
rejected the true user and reported an ANIA of 304 keystrokes
(for the system trained with the least amount of imposter data).
The authors present multiple scenarios with varying degrees of
imposter data being known to the system.
In summary, existing methods currently fail to authenticate
users quickly, until our own recent work [9], often requiring
500 or more keystrokes. Furthermore, existing algorithms treat
monograph and digraph features equally instead of studying their
individual impact on performance. In contrast, we show here that
by using a fused matching score, calculated from the feature im-
portance of monographs and digraphs (Section 7.2), and our novel
ITAD metric, we can achieve authentication with small numbers
of keystrokes (fewer than 100). Our results are presented using
detection error tradeoff (DET curves), EER, and ANGA/ANIA. In
all cases, our methods are shown to outperform the state-of-the-art.
3 FEATURES
Timing information recorded from keystrokes can be considered
a time series. In its raw form, it is non-stationary because the
time interval between keystrokes can occur at any interval and
is not sampled at a continuous rate [25]. Working with non-
stationary time series data can be very challenging and one of
the common approaches to extract stationary data is differencing
[26], [27]. The concept of differencing in keystroke dynamics may
sound foreign, but in fact goes as far back as the 1980s when
researchers used digraphs defined as the time taken to type two
consecutive characters [28]. For their study, the authors only had
access to the time a key was pressed down, so they believed
digraphs to be the lowest level feature in their experiment. A
survey of 187 papers [2], found that 49% used digraphs, 41%
used monographs, 5% used pressure, and 5% used other features
(pressure is not considered in this paper as it requires special
hardware to collect the data). Additionally, Teh et al. point out
that research investigating and comparing common features used
for keystroke dynamics is missing. This could be very beneficial
to the keystroke dynamics field by providing insight to which
features are most explanative of user behavior.
The features commonly used today are the result of differenc-
ing. Monographs are defined as the time between when a key is
pressed down to when it is released. Digraphs, or flight times, are
usually defined in literature to be the time between two connective
key-presses. In this work, four different definitions of digraphs
are used, referred to as DD, UD, DU, and UU. D corresponds
to a key-down event and U corresponds to a key-up event. The
four digraph features are the time from the first key either being
pressed (D) or released (U) to the time the second key is pressed or
released. The monograph feature and the four digraph features can
be seen in Fig. 1. Similar to work done in [8], the graphs are only
considered if their durations fall in a specific range to eliminate
digraph durations that span pauses or typing sessions.
Although trigraphs and other n-graphs have shown to be
highly representative of users, no trigraph features or n-graph fea-
tures are used in this work due to the focus on fast authentication.
Using only the English alphabet, there are 26 distinct monographs,
26 × 26 = 676 distinct digraphs, and 26 × 26 × 26 = 17, 576
distinct trigraphs. The numbers are much larger when including
punctuation, numbers, and other function keys. While of course
not all digraphs, trigraphs, or n-graphs have the same probability
of occurrence, it is clear to see that with minimal keystrokes in the
test sample, the probability of getting trigraphs or larger n-graphs
that match a given profile is low.
4 DATASETS
In this paper, two publicly available datasets, the Clarkson II
uncontrolled free-text dataset [14] and the Buffalo partially con-
trolled free-text dataset [12], are used to validate our results.
The Buffalo free-text dataset consists of a total of 148 par-
ticipants who contributed a combined 2.14 million keystrokes
[12]. The Buffalo dataset is split into two categories: baseline and
rotation. The baseline set has 75 users where the same keyboard is
used. The rotation set has 73 users and three different keyboards
are used. Within both rotation and baseline, there were three
identical sessions consisting of transcribing Steve Jobs commence-
ment speech at Stanford University, free-text response to survey
questions, and an image, as well as some tasks designed to mimic
daily work such as responding to emails and freely surfing the
internet. We consider the Buffalo dataset partially controlled free-
text because it is a combination of free-text and transcribing tasks.
The rotation enables researchers to study the effects of different
keyboards on typing behavior.
The Clarkson II dataset was collected at Clarkson University
[14]. Containing over 12.9 million keystrokes across 103 users,
to the best of our knowledge, it is the largest free-text dataset
available where an average user has 125,000 keystrokes. This
dataset is different from the other publicly available datasets as
all keystrokes are recorded as users interact normally with their
computers. A keylogger ran in the background of participants
computers, passively recording all of their keystrokes regardless
of application or context. Users had the option of temporarily
disabling the keylogger to protect their private information.
As discussed in Section 2, the performance of algorithms on
the Clarkson II dataset compared to other more controlled free-
text datasets is always worse [8]. The Buffalo dataset is partially
controlled, due to containing free-text and transcribing tasks,
whereas the Clarkson II dataset is completely uncontrolled. As
a result, we expect the performance of all algorithms to be better
on the Buffalo dataset.
In previous works, digraphs and keystrokes are both common
methods of measuring the amount of data in the profile and
test sample. For example, a test sample size of 50 DD digraphs
contains 50 DD digraphs and all other graph features that occurred
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while typing those DD digraphs, and a test sample size of 50
keystrokes contains all graph features that occur within those 50
keystrokes. To best compare our results to literature, we provide
a table of feature occurrence for the monograph and four digraph
features for both datasets in the Appendix (Table 7). Table 7 can be
used to freely convert keystrokes to DD digraphs and vice versa.
In this paper, our results will be presented in terms of DD digraphs
with the exception of Section 8.3 where keystrokes are used.
5 ALGORITHMS
Instance-based algorithms compare a single instance (occurrence)
of a graph from the test sample to the profile. The test sample
itself typically consists a block of graphs. In contrast, distribution-
based algorithms construct a probability density function (PDF) of
a graph for the profile and for the test sample. The two PDFs are
then compared to determine dissimilarity or similarity. Instance-
based algorithms are extensively seen in fixed-text research, but
seldomly seen for free-text. Distribution-based algorithms are
commonly used for free-text. However, they require more graphs
in the test sample for comparisons to be made [9]. Profiles for
a graph are only built if there are four or more occurrences
of that graph (for both instance-based and distribution-based).
Requiring a minimum of four graphs is based upon previous works
[8] as well as our own empirical observations. The test sample,
however, can be a single instance of a graph for instance-based
algorithms, but four or more instances for each graph are needed
for distribution-based algorithms.
The instance-based algorithms used in this paper include Man-
hattan [29], scaled Manhattan [29], Mahalanobis [30], transformed
Mahalanobis [6], and the ITAD metric. The distribution-based
algorithm used is the KDE algorithm introduced by Huang et al.
[8]. We describe these algorithms as follows.
5.1 Instance-based
The algorithms are used to compute a distance or similarity score
from the keystrokes in the test sample to the keystrokes in the
profile of the authorized user. The distance or similarity score
represents how likely it was that test sample came from the
authorized user. Depending on the scores, the test user is either
allowed continued access or is locked out of the system.
5.1.1 Manhattan distance
The scaled Manhattan and Manhattan distance metrics were used
by Kilhourhy and Maxion for fixed-text keystroke dynamics [7].
The scaled Manhattan distance is calculated as follows
D =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|µgi − xi|
σgi
, (1)
where N is the number of graphs shared between the test sample
and the profile, xi is the individual test graph duration for the ith
shared graph in the test sample, and µgi and σgi are the mean
and standard deviation of the ith graph in the profile [7]. The
scaled Manhattan distance formula has been altered slightly to
become the average distance (by multiplying by 1N ) allowing for
better comparisons to be made between test samples with different
numbers of graphs shared with the profile. The Manhattan and
scaled Manhattan distances are identical, except the Manhattan
distance is not divided by the standard deviation [29].
5.1.2 Mahalanobis distance
The Mahalanobis distance is similar to the scaled Manhattan
distance and is given by
D =
1
N
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(µgi − xi)2
σ2gi
, (2)
where N is the number of graphs shared between the test sample
and the profile, xi is the individual test graph duration for the ith
shared graph in the test sample, and µgi and σgi are the mean
and standard deviation of the ith graph in the profile [7], [30]. The
Mahalanobis metric is also multiplied by 1N to control for different
numbers of shared graphs between the test sample and the profile.
5.1.3 Transformed Mahalanobis
The transformed Mahalanobis distance metric is calculated with
the same formula as the Mahalanobis metric. However, before
computing the Mahalanobis distance, the profile distribution is
transformed to a Gaussian distribution. The transformation is
done through the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), where
the CDF value is held constant by mapping the x value to the
corresponding x value for the desired distribution [6], [31]. Both
the Manhattan and Mahalanobis distance metrics assume Gaussian
data. Transforming the data to Gaussian and then using metrics
designed for Gaussian distributed data is therefore a natural
choice. The transformation process and distance score calculation
can be combined as
D =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Q−1(CDFgi(xi))]
2, (3)
where N is the number of graphs shared between the test sample
and the profile, Q−1(·) is the inverse Q-function [32], CDFgi(·)
is the empirical cumulative distribution function of the ith graph in
the profile, and xi is the individual test graph duration for the ith
shared graph in the test sample [6]. As with the scaled Manhattan
and Mahalanobis distances, this metric is averaged for a fairer
comparison between the profile and test sample.
5.1.4 Instance-based Tail Area Density (ITAD) Metric
A new instance-based distance metric we propose in this paper
is referred to as the ITAD metric. The ITAD metric makes no
assumptions about distributions and solely relies on the tail area
under the PDF, or the percentile value of the sample. The ITAD
metric is calculated as follows:
si =
{
CDFgi(xi) if xi ≤Mgi
1− CDFgi(xi) if xi > Mgi ,
(4)
where N is the number of graphs shared between the test sample
and the profile, CDFgi(·) is the empirical cumulative distribution
function of the ith graph in the profile, Mgi is the median of the
ith graph in the profile, and xi is the individual test graph duration
for the ith shared graph in the test sample. The ITAD metric is
always between 0 and 0.5, and because it is a similarity score, the
larger the s value, the closer the sample is to the profile. The ITAD
metric for N singular graph durations is combined into a single
similarity score S as:
S =
1
N
N∑
i=1
si
p. (5)
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The parameter p serves as a scaling factor and can be tuned
depending on the application. If 0 < p < 1 then lower scores are
scaled up more than higher scores and if p > 1 then larger scores
will be shifted down by a lesser amount than lower scores.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of how the ITAD
metric is computed. In terms of the PDF, the ITAD metric is
computed as the tail area of the PDF. When the sample is below
the median value, the ITAD metric takes the tail area on the left
and when the sample is above the median, the ITAD metric takes
the tail area on the right.
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of how the ITAD metric is computed
from the PDF (a) and (b) or CDF (c) and (d).
Many of the previous works using instance-based algorithms
have used Euclidean distance, Mahalanobis distance, or probabil-
ity scores all of which were based on a mean and variance from
user profiles [6], [15]. These methods rely on the data having
a meaningful mean and variance, which is not necessarily the
case for non-Gaussian data. Figure 3 shows the PDFs of “t+h”
digraphs for two users which are clearly not Gaussian, suggesting
a Gaussian approximation may not be the best assumption. For
example, the sample mean of the data in Figure 3 (a) will be
directly in between the two peaks of the data. For this distribution,
the distance from the mean will always be high, not because test
samples are anomalous, but rather because the model does not fit
the data well. The ITAD metric takes the percentile value, which
causes it to be more resistant to outliers than the sample mean.
Fig. 3. Two digraph PDF’s exhibiting clear non-Gaussian behavior from
the Clarkson II dataset. The y-axis is relative frequency of occurrence
and the x-axis is the time in milliseconds of the “t+h” digraph.
However, the main power of the ITAD metric is from its non-
parametric estimation of underlying distributions, which, as illus-
trated in Figure 3, are often not Gaussian. As a result, similarity
or distance metrics such as Mahalanobis and Manhattan distance,
which assume a Gaussian distribution, perform worse than our
newly proposed ITAD metric. The Mahalanobis and Manhattan
distances work well when each distribution is Gaussian because
they provide a framework of normalizing each distribution to zero
mean and unit variance, allowing for straightforward combination
of multiple samples from different distributions. The ITAD metric
can be thought of as providing a similar framework, but for when
the distributions are not all of one type (i.e. Gaussian). The ITAD
metric determines the average similarity between multiple non-
parametric distributions (determined empirically from a set of
previous observations) and a new observation.
5.2 KDE
The distribution-based algorithm studied in this paper is the kernel
density estimation (KDE) metric [8], [9]. KDE is a non-parametric
method used to estimate the PDF of a random variable. Here, it
is used to create a PDF of the times for each graph from a finite
number (> 4) of samples [32]. KDE is distribution-based and
therefore requires four or more of the same graph in both the
profile and the test sample. In this paper, the python library scikit-
learn’s implementation of Gaussian KDE for PDF estimation [33]
is used. Once the PDFs are estimated, the absolute difference
between the PDFs from the profile and test samples is calculated,
summed, and then averaged across all the different digraphs to
produce one scalar value:
D =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[PDFtrain(xi)− PDFtest(xi)]. (6)
6 COMPARISON OF ALGORITHMS
In this section, to compare the six algorithms, an experiment
is conducted using the Clarkson II and the Buffalo datasets.
Profiles are built with 10,000 consecutive DD digraphs from the
authorized user and tested with sample sizes ranging from 10
to 1,000 DD digraphs from the authorized user and impostors.
The impostors data is taken from all other users. The profiles
are randomly selected from all available graphs and the genuine
test samples are selected from the remaining graphs. Results are
averaged across users and 10 independent subsets of the data to
ensure representative results. To compute a distance score for each
algorithm, the profile for a graph must contain at least four or
more occurrences. For the distribution-based algorithm, the test
sample must also contain four or more occurrences. Instance-
based algorithms, on the other hand, can compute a distance score
from only a single instance of a graph in the test sample.
Table 2 shows the EERs for the 6 different algorithms using
the monograph and digraph features individually and fused for
the Clarkson II dataset. The score level fusion process for the
monograph and digraph features is discussed in detail in Section
7. There are two general trends that can be seen from Table 2. First,
the performance of the ITAD metric and transformed Mahalanobis
distance is similar and outperforms all other metrics for the
individual features and the fused matching score. Second, the
best performance for every algorithm is achieved when using the
fused matching score. It can also be seen that the best performing
individual features are the UU and DD digraphs followed by the
DU digraph, monographs, and the UD digraph.
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The KDE algorithm has slight exceptions to the above trends.
Due to being distribution-based, KDE requires more graphs in the
test sample. With only 50 DD digraphs, a stable EER cannot be
computed for the digraphs. As a result, the monograph feature
performs best overall (by default) followed closely by the fused
matching score (which essentially is just the monograph). The
trends are the same with the Buffalo dataset, but it is worth noting
that the EERs are slightly lower for the Buffalo dataset compared
to the Clarkson II dataset, for given number of digraphs, due to
the uncontrolled nature of the Clarkson II dataset.
TABLE 2
Equal Error Rates (EERs) for the six algorithms using the monograph
and digraph features individually and fused for the Clarkson II dataset.
The EERs are produced when there are 50 DD digraphs in the test
sample. In most cases, the ITAD metric yields the lowest EERs for each
feature individually, and fused. Similarly, the performance of the
algorithms improve with our fused matching score.
Algorithm FeatureM DD UD DU UU Fused
ITAD 0.248 0.197 0.296 0.202 0.164 0.123
KDE 0.220 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.235
Manhattan 0.290 0.282 0.329 0.256 0.243 0.231
Scaled Manhattan 0.244 0.225 0.301 0.224 0.211 0.176
Mahalanobis 0.243 0.278 0.337 0.268 0.270 0.223
Transformed Mahalanobis 0.252 0.194 0.277 0.208 0.161 0.129
Fig. 4. EER versus test sample size (in terms of DD digraphs) for
the Clarkson II dataset for 6 different algorithms. The instance-based
algorithms achieve lower EERs with fewer digraphs than the distribution-
based metric (KDE). With approximately 300-400 or more digraphs, the
KDE metric begins to outperform the instance-based metrics.
Figure 4 shows the EERs for varying numbers of DD digraphs
in the test sample. The instance-based algorithms outperform the
distribution-based algorithm for small test sample sizes. When the
number of DD digraphs is less than 80, a stable EER cannot
be computed for the KDE algorithm and is set to 0.5 (random
guessing). At roughly 300 DD digraphs, the distribution-based
metric starts to perform better than the instance-based metrics.
Requiring 300 or more DD digraphs is far too many keystrokes
for fast authentication. After 300 DD digraphs, an imposter could
have typed 4-5 sentences (see Table 1) leaving users vulnerable.
Therefore, we focus on instance-based metrics and in particular,
the transformed Mahalanobis and ITAD metrics. These metrics
outperform the other instance-based metrics for all test sample
sizes and distribution-based metrics for small test sample sizes.
7 FEATURE SELECTION
Many keystroke dynamics works use monographs and digraphs
[2]. These features have been shown to separate users based
on their typing behaviors. In this section, we investigate which
features are important for user authentication. The feature impor-
tances are then used to determine an optimal fused matching score
further improving authentication results. The feature importances
are only shown for the ITAD metric, because the overall trends are
the same for every algorithm.
7.1 Feature Importance
Feature importance is determined using a random forest classifier
from both the Clarkson II uncontrolled free-text dataset [14] and
the partially controlled free-text Buffalo dataset [12]. The feature
importance is taken as the mean decrease in impurity (MDI) from
the random forest classifier. MDI is defined as the total decrease in
node impurity (weighted by the probability of reaching that node)
averaged over all the trees in the ensemble [34]. The probability of
reaching the node is approximated by the proportion of samples
reaching that node. The scikit-learn implementation of random
forests and MDI are used in this paper [33].
The feature importances are calculated for the monograph and
four digraph features with 10,000 DD digraphs in the profile and
using different numbers of DD digraphs in the test sample: 10, 20,
50, 100, and 200. A one versus all random forest classifier is built
for each user. The inputs to the random forest are the scores from
the ITAD metric for each feature. To ensure the the importances
are representative of the data, they are calculated for each user
50 times with different subsets of user data and then averaged
together. The average feature importances are reported in Tables 3
and 4 for the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets.
TABLE 3
Relative feature importances at 10, 20, 50, 100, and 200 DD digraphs
in the test sample with 10,000 DD digraphs in the profile for the
Clarkson II dataset. For each test sample size, the cells highlighted in
blue and red denote the feature with the highest and lowest importance.
Feature Test Sample Size10 20 50 100 200
M 0.236 0.241 0.193 0.157 0.144
DD 0.221 0.207 0.229 0.246 0.240
UD 0.129 0.107 0.088 0.091 0.095
DU 0.201 0.207 0.217 0.208 0.211
UU 0.214 0.238 0.273 0.299 0.31
TABLE 4
Relative feature importances at 10, 20, 30, 50, 100, and 200 DD
digraphs in the test sample with 10,000 DD digraphs in the profile for
the Buffalo dataset. For each test sample size, the cells highlighted in
blue and red denote the feature with the highest and lowest importance.
Feature Test Sample Size10 20 50 100 200
M 0.284 0.269 0.228 0.174 0.140
DD 0.209 0.221 0.235 0.256 0.270
UD 0.123 0.101 0.083 0.082 0.085
DU 0.169 0.178 0.174 0.193 0.203
UU 0.214 0.232 0.280 0.295 0.302
The least important feature for both datasets and all test sample
sizes is the UD digraph. The most important feature for both
datasets is between the monograph and UU digraph. For smaller
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test sample sizes the monograph feature becomes more important
and for larger test sample sizes the UU digraph is more important.
While the feature importances are only shown for the ITAD
metric, the overall trends are the same for every algorithm. The
only exception is for KDE which finds monographs far more
important at smaller test sample sizes (as seen in Section 6). This
is because with small test samples sizes it is far more likely to see
four of the same monograph than four of the same digraph (KDE
is distribution-based and needs four or more occurrences in both
the profile and test set to compute a distance score).
7.2 Score-level Fusion
While some features are more important than others, they all
contribute to the overall classification. All five features are fused
at the score level to combine the individual graph features into
a single matching score. A weighted average of the graph scores
is taken using the feature importances calculated from the MDI
as the weights. This allows the five graph scores to be combined
into a single fused matching score. Thresholding is performed on
this single matching score to produce DET curves and EERs. This
process was used in Section 6 to compare the six algorithms.
Fig. 5. DET curves for the Clarkson II dataset for the five graph features
as well as the fused case for a profile size of 10,000 DD digraphs and
test sample size of 50 DD digraphs. The best performing feature is
the UU digraph and the worst performing feature is the UD digraph,
consistent with the feature importance. A clear improvement can be
seen from fusing the five features.
Figure 5 shows the performance of the features individually
and fused using the ITAD metric for the Clarkson II dataset. The
trends across the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets are identical
and therefore only the results for Clarkson II are shown. The
feature importances are consistent with the DET curves. Features
with higher importance have lower EERs and features with lower
importance have higher EERs. It can also be clearly seen that fus-
ing the five features together yields the best overall performance.
While the EERs are shown only for the ITAD metric, just as with
the feature importances, the overall trends are still the same for
every algorithm. Again, the KDE algorithm is different because
monographs contribute to the overall decision far more at smaller
test sample sizes.
8 EVALUATION OF THE ITAD METRIC
The performance of the ITAD metric is evaluated with different
test sample sizes, profile sizes, as well as in terms of the average
number of genuine actions (ANGA) and the average number of
imposter actions (ANIA). The evaluations are done in terms of
DD digraphs (except for ANGA and ANIA which are presented
in terms of keystrokes). In the three following subsections, the
ITAD metric is used with the fusion of the five graph features to
obtain results. We have used p = 12 for combining the individual
similarity scores into a single similarity score. We use DET curves,
EERs, ANGA, and ANIA to present our results.
8.1 Effect of Test Sample Size
The performance of our algorithm is heavily dependent on the
number of DD digraphs (or keystrokes) present in the test sample.
With large numbers of DD digraphs in the test sample, accuracy
will be better, and with fewer DD digraphs, the accuracy will be
worse. Fast authentication (fewer DD digraphs) is preferable as
intruders should be detected as soon as possible to mitigate risk.
Figures 6 and 7 show the DET curves for varying test sample
sizes for both the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets. The curves
are produced with 10,000 DD digraphs in the user profiles. Monte
Carlo cross validation is performed and the experiment is repeated
50 times using different subsets of user data.
Fig. 6. DET curves for the Clarkson II dataset with the fused matching
score and ITAD metric. The profile size is 10,000 DD digraphs and the
test sample size ranges from 10 to 200 DD digraphs. As the test sample
size increases the performance improves, but with diminishing returns.
As can be seen for both the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets,
the more DD digraphs in the test sample the better the perfor-
mance. This is consistent with previous works using distribution
based algorithms [35]. In general, the performance on the Buffalo
dataset is better than the Clarkson II dataset due to the uncon-
trolled nature of the Clarkson II dataset. The EERs for all test
sample sizes and both datasets are summarized in Table 5. The
lowest EERs for the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets are 7.8%
and 3.0% with 200 DD digraphs in the test sample.
Previous work achieved best EERs on the Clarkson II dataset
of 35.3% and 15.3% for test sample sizes of 100 and 200 DD
digraphs respectively [9]. The ITAD metric achieves EERs of
12.3%, 9.7%, 7.8% for the Clarkson II dataset with 50, 100,
and 200 DD digraphs in the test sample. For the Buffalo dataset,
the ITAD metric achieves EERs of 8.0%, 5.3%, and 3.0% with
50, 100, and 200 DD digraphs in the test sample. In addition
to allowing authentication with fewer than 100 DD digraphs, the
ITAD metric shows improvement over the existing state-of-the-art
algorithms for test sample sizes fewer than 300 DD digraphs.
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Fig. 7. DET curves for the Buffalo dataset with the fused matching score
and ITAD metric. The profile size is 10,000 DD digraphs and the test
sample size is varied from 10 to 200 DD digraphs. As the test sample
size increases the performance improves, but with diminishing returns.
TABLE 5
EERs for varying test sample sizes (in terms of DD digraphs) for the
Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets using the ITAD metric with the fused
matching score. There are 10,000 DD digraphs used in the profile.
Dataset Test Sample Size10 20 50 100 200
Clarkson II 0.221 0.177 0.123 0.097 0.078
Buffalo 0.199 0.136 0.080 0.053 0.030
8.2 Effect of Profile Size
In this section, the performance of our algorithm is evaluated
depending on the amount of DD digraphs in the profile. Building
a user profile is a necessary part of keystroke dynamics authenti-
cation. While it is important imposters are detected after as few
DD digraphs (or keystrokes) as possible, convenient use of the
system is important as well. Users need to be able to enroll quickly
(with fewer DD digraphs) or they may lose interest and decide our
biometric recognition system is not worth using. According to
[36], the average number of characters per minute is 187. This
means it would take approximately one hour of continuous typing
to collect 10,000 DD digraphs.
Figures 8 and 9 show the DET curves for varying profile sizes
for both the Clarkson II and Buffalo datasets. As the profile size
increases the performance improves, but suffers from diminishing
returns. It was found in [35] that the performance improved as
the profile size increased (only when profile and test sizes were
both larger otherwise performance decreased). We find there is no
decrease in performance, but instead, performance plateaus. This
is promising as an adequate user profile may be constructed with
as few as 1,000 DD digraphs, allowing for fast enrollment.
8.3 ANGA and ANIA
Another way of presenting keystroke dynamics system perfor-
mance is through the average number of genuine actions (ANGA)
before an authorized user is rejected and the average number
of imposter actions (ANIA) before an imposter is locked out
[23], [24]. The ANGA and ANIA are directly related to the
block size, FAR, and FRR as ANGA = block size/FRR and
ANIA = block size/(1− FAR).
Fig. 8. DET curves for the Clarkson II dataset using the fused matching
score and the ITAD metric. The profile size is varied from 1,000 to 30,000
DD digraphs with 50 DD digraphs in the test sample. As the profile size
increases the performance improves, but with diminishing returns.
Fig. 9. DET curves for the Buffalo dataset using the fused matching
score and the ITAD metric. The profile size is varied from 1,000 to 10,000
DD digraphs with 50 DD digraphs in the test sample. As the profile size
increases the performance improves, but with diminishing returns.
To compare performance in terms of ANGA and ANIA, three
points along the DET curve of test sample size of 20 are selected.
Point ‘a’ favors security, point ‘b’ weights convenience and secu-
rity equally (the equal error rate), and point ‘c’ favors convenience.
The FAR, FRR, ANGA, and ANIA for the aforementioned points
are shown in Table 6 in terms of keystrokes (converted from DD
digraphs using Table 7).
In order for a continuous authentication system to be useful,
it cannot reject the authorized user too frequently; therefore,
convenience is prioritized above security. As a result, we focus
on point ‘c’ where our algorithm achieves ANGAs and ANIAs of
3,483 and 113 keystrokes for the Clarkson II dataset and 15,250
and 71 keystrokes for the Buffalo dataset. In other words, the
authorized user expects on average one false reject after 3,483
keystrokes and an imposter to be rejected after 113 keystrokes.
For the Buffalo dataset, the authorized user expects on average
one false reject after 15,250 keystrokes. However, an imposter
would be rejected after on average 71 keystrokes. This allows for
additional security to be added while only minimally impacting
the authorized user.
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TABLE 6
Average number of Genuine Actions (ANGA) and Average Number of
Imposter Actions (ANIA), in terms of keystrokes (see Table 7), for
points on DET curves with test sample size of 20. The points a, b, and
c illustrate the tradeoff between security and convenience. These
results are compared with [23].
Algorithm FAR FRR ANGA ANIA
‘a’ Clarkson II 0.0196 0.7552 40 32
‘b’ Clarkson II 0.1768 0.1768 169 37
‘c’ Clarkson II 0.7346 0.0085 3483 113
‘a’ Buffalo 0.0338 0.4900 51 26
‘b’ Buffalo 0.1343 0.1343 182 30
‘c’ Buffalo 0.6500 0.0016 15250 71
Mondal and Bours - - ∞ 304
While our ANGA is worse than Mondal and Bours [23] (see
Table 6)), it is still sufficiently large to have minimal impact on
user experience (their experiments were conducted with uncon-
trolled free-text data). The ANIA, on the other hand, has been
reduced significantly to more quickly detect and lockout would-be
imposters robustly protecting user data. It is worth noting that we
have only reported Mondal and Bours best case results which was
valid only for roughly 60% of users and the models were tuned
with 50% of the impostor users. For the other 40% of users, the
performance had lower ANGAs and/or higher ANIAs.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose the ITAD metric, a novel instance-based
algorithm, to reduce the number of DD digraphs (or keystrokes)
required to authenticate users. We also investigate the effectiveness
of monographs and digraphs, commonly used features in the
keystroke dynamics literature, for user authentication. The most
important features for fast authentication were determined to be
the monograph, UU digraph, and DD digraph. However, all the
features contributed information about who was typing. Scores
from the five features were weighted with their feature importance
to construct a new matching score providing best authentication
results. Our fused matching score, when combined with the ITAD
metric, is shown to outperform the state-of-the-art across two
publicly available datasets allowing us to detect imposters faster
and more robustly protect user data.
Previous work achieved best EERs on the Clarkson II dataset
[14] of 35.3% and 15.3% for test sample sizes of 100, and 200
DD digraphs respectively [9]. Our novel ITAD metric achieves
EERs of 12.3%, 9.7%, and 7.8% for the Clarkson II dataset and
8.0%, 5.3%, and 3.0% for the Buffalo dataset [12] with 50, 100,
and 200 DD digraphs in the test sample, a noticeable improvement
over existing state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, our algorithm
achieves ANGAs of 3,483 and 15,250 keystrokes for the Clarkson
II dataset and ANIAs of 113 and 71 keystrokes for the Buffalo
dataset, a significant improvement over the previous best ANIA of
304 keystrokes [23]. Our fused matching score, when combined
with the ITAD metric, is capable of detecting imposters more than
twice as fast as the previous state-of-the-art.
Future work includes investigating the effects of old or out-
dated profiles on performance because typing patterns have been
shown to change or fluctuate over time. How often a genuine
user would be rejected and its effect on usability will also be
investigated to determine an appropriate balance between ANGA
and ANIA (convenience and security). Other avenues of research
include training machine learning and deep learning algorithms,
such as neural networks, convolutional neural networks, and
recurrent neural networks for keystroke dynamics.
APPENDIX
FEATURE FREQUENCY
In many keystroke dynamics works, digraphs and keystrokes are
both common methods of measuring the amount of data in the
profile and test sample. Table 7 shows feature occurrence for the
monograph and four digraph features for both datasets and can be
used to freely convert keystrokes to DD digraphs and vice versa.
The feature frequencies have been normalized in terms of the DD
digraph and represent the number of graphs, on average, that can
be expected after 1 DD digraph.
TABLE 7
Frequencies of occurrence of the features relative to the DD digraph.
There will be more keystrokes and monographs than digraphs because
of pauses in typing. The Buffalo dataset is closer to the ideal case as
the dataset is partially controlled, whereas for the uncontrolled
Clarkson II dataset there are many more keystrokes than graphs.
Dataset Keystrokes M DD UD DU UU
Clarkson II [14] 1.48 1.36 1.00 0.95 1.08 0.98
Buffalo [12] 1.22 1.16 1.00 0.95 1.06 1.00
Table 7 shows, for both datasets, there are more keystrokes
than monographs and more monographs than digraphs. This is
the result of filtering out keystrokes that likely occur across
sessions and other outliers, e.g. typing one-handed while eating
a sandwich. In fact, previous work on the Clarkson II dataset has
shown that by filtering “gibberish” keystrokes from the keystroke
data, performance improves [37]. By removing the “gibberish”
keystrokes, the ratio of keystrokes to usable graphs becomes closer
to 1. In this paper, no “gibberish” filtering is done to ensure our
results are most representative of typical user typing behavior.
It should be noted that under ideal conditions, keystrokes
and monographs should have the same frequency of occurrence.
However, digraphs will always be slightly fewer because if there
areN keystrokes there will beN monographs andN−1 digraphs.
For example, if the average typing session lasts 10 keystrokes
before pausing then only 90% of keystrokes will result in digraphs.
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